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Postsecularism	and	International	Relations	
Luca	Mavelli	and	Erin	K.	Wilson	
	
Introduction	
Postsecularism	 has	 gained	 increasing	 relevance	 within	 and	 beyond	 international	 relations	 (IR)	 in	
recent	years.	Within	 IR,	the	term	has	been	employed	primarily	 in	two	different	yet	 interconnected	
ways.	 Firstly,	 postsecularism	 has	 operated	 descriptively	 to	 explain	 the	 return	 or	 resilience	 of	
religious	 traditions	 in	modern	 life.	 This	 has	 produced	 two	 different	 responses.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	
scholars	 have	 attempted	 to	 develop	 conceptual	 frameworks	 that	 move	 beyond	 the	 dominant	
assumptions	 of	 secularization	 theory	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 religion’s	 surprising	 persistence	 in	 late	
modernity.	On	the	other	hand,	there	have	been	calls	for	the	development	of	new	models	of	politics	
able	 to	 include	 religious	 views.	 Such	 calls	 represent	 the	 second	 and	 more	 innovative	 meaning	
attributed	 to	 postsecularism,	 in	 which	 it	 operates	 as	 a	 form	 of	 radical	 theorising	 and	 critique	
prompted	by	the	idea	that	values	such	as	democracy,	freedom,	equality,	 inclusion,	and	justice	may	
not	 necessarily	 be	 best	 pursued	 within	 an	 exclusively	 immanent	 secular	 framework.	 Quite	 the	
opposite,	the	secular	may	be	a	site	of	isolation,	domination,	violence,	and	exclusion.	
The	 thriving	 debate	 on	 religion	 in	 international	 politics	 originally	 revolved	 around	 the	 ‘return	 of	
religion’	in	IR.	Scholars	have	focused	on	how	religion	could	be	incorporated	into	existing	conceptual	
and	 political	 frameworks	 by	 exploring	 its	 contribution	 to	 processes	 of	 modernisation,	
democratisation	and	peace-building	and	 its	wider	 implications	 for	 future	world	orders.	 The	 recent	
debate	on	postsecularism,	however,	has	more	radical	connotations	which	encompass	the	idea	of	a	
paradigm	shift.	This	is	an	attempt	to	move	beyond	the	secular	and	thus	the	secular/religious	divide,	
which	 can	 be	 considered	 one	 of	 the	 foundational	 dimensions	 of	Western	 secular	modernity.	 The	
question	raised	by	the	postsecular,	then,	is	not	just	one	of	incorporation	of	the	presence	of	religion	
into	 existing	 theoretical	 frameworks,	 but	 one	 of	 conceptual	 innovation	 to	 account	 for	 a	
transformation	 which	 invests	 the	 very	 structures	 of	 consciousness	 and	 power,	 and	 existing	
understandings	of	political	community.		
The	importance	of	this	transformation	surfaces	in	recent	writings	from	Jürgen	Habermas,	the	thinker	
who,	 probably	 more	 than	 anyone	 else,	 has	 contributed	 to	 igniting	 the	 current	 debate	 on	
postsecularism.	 For	 Habermas,	 postsecularism	 is	 a	 ‘change	 in	 consciousness’	 that	 characterises	
traditionally	secular	societies,	such	as	European	ones.1	This	change	stems	from,	on	the	one	hand,	the	
emergence	of	 increasingly	pluralistic	 societies,	where	a	 growing	number	of	 citizens	 are	bearers	of	
religious	convictions,	which	calls	for	the	elaboration	of	new	frameworks	of	public	engagement	and	
civic	 coexistence;	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 from	 the	 crisis	 of	 secularism	 and	 secular	 consciousness,	
																																								 																				
1	Habermas,	“Notes	on	a	Post-Secular	Society”.	
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characterised	 by	 a	 progressive	 fragmentation	 of	 values	 and	 an	 underlying	 incapacity	 to	 address	
pressing	 ethical	 and	 political	 questions	 (such	 as	 euthanasia	 or	 social	 justice)	 in	 a	 context	 of	
increasing	 neoliberal	 globalization.2	 These	 two	 questions,	 according	 to	 Habermas,	 demand	 new	
sources	 of	 moral	 inspiration	 and	 interpretation	 and	 suggest	 that	 ‘the	 modernization	 of	 public	
consciousness’	can	no	 longer	be	conceived	solely	as	the	secularisation	of	religious	sensibilities,	but	
demands	a	reflexive	cooperative	effort	of	both	secular	and	religious	mentalities.3	Religion	can	thus	
act	as	a	reservoir	of	moral	resources	for	the	secular	domain.		
The	debate	on	postsecularism	has	primarily	focused	on	the	normative	implications	of	this	argument	
by	 discussing	 the	 possibility	 of	 ‘a	model	 of	 law	 and	 politics	 in	 which	 religious	 arguments	 are	 not	
excluded	 from	 political	 debate’,4	 in	 order	 to	 face	 the	 challenges	 of	 pluralism,	 cohesion	 and	
integration	in	a	globalised	world	in	which	secularism	no	longer	or	not	always	seems	to	be	capable	of	
providing	the	framework	in	which	democratic	participation,	freedom,	equality,	justice	and	inclusion	
may	be	achieved.	A	second,	interconnected,	but	less	studied	dimension	of	postsecularism	concerns	
the	underlying	politics	of	resistance	that	characterises	this	concept.	Once	again	Habermas	seems	to	
suggest	 this	 path	 when	 he	 argues	 that	 postsecularism	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 rescue	 a	 ‘pure	 practical	
reason’	that	‘can	no	longer	be	so	conﬁdent	in	its	ability	to	counteract	a	modernization	spinning	out	
of	control	armed	solely	with	the	insights	of	a	theory	of	justice’	and	to	oppose	the	disruptive	forces	of	
‘markets	 and	 administrative	 powers’	 which	 ‘are	 displacing	 social	 solidarity’.5	 As	Mariano	 Barbato	
points	out,	postsecularism	for	Habermas	 is	 the	use	of	 ‘religious	semantic	potential’	 to	oppose	 ‘the	
pathologies	 of	 neoliberal	 modernisation	 and	 globalisation’.6	 Similarly,	 Paul	 Cloke	 and	 Justin	
Beaumont	describe	it	as	‘an	expression	of	resistance	to	prevailing	injustices	under	neoliberal	global	
capitalism,	and	an	energy	and	hope	in	something	that	brings	more	justice	for	all	citizens’.7	
This	chapter	introduces	these	two	dimensions	of	the	contemporary	debate	on	postsecularism	in	IR.	
It	starts	by	looking	at	Habermas’	understanding	of	postsecularism	and	argue	that,	despite	 its	merit	
and	achievements,	his	perspective	is	shaped	by	an	ultimately	secular	logic	that	reduces	religion	to	a	
set	 of	 cognitive	 choices	 and	 a	 function	 in	 broader	 processes	 of	 social	 production,	 using	 it	
instrumentally	 to	 address	 the	 crisis	 of	 secularism	 by	 leaving	 the	 political	 authority	 of	 the	 latter	
fundamentally	 unchallenged.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 neglects	 religion	 as	 tradition,	 practice,	 and	 lived	
experience.	 These	 problems,	 we	 argue,	 rest	 on	 a	 disembodied	 and	 cognitive	 understanding	 of	
religion	and,	accordingly,	of	postsecularism.	In	the	second	section	we	discuss	the	role	of	emotions	in	
shaping	 a	 contending	 ‘embodied’	 understanding	 of	 postsecularism	 and	 provide	 an	 empirical	
illustration	 of	 this	 argument	 by	 exploring	 the	 2011	 Egyptian	 revolution.	 The	 discussion	 highlights	
how	postsecularism	 cannot	 solely	 be	 conceived	as	 a	 cooperative	 cognitive	 effort	 between	 secular	
and	 religious	mentalities,	but	also	as	a	 form	of	 resistance	sustained	by	embodied	practices.	 In	 the	
																																								 																				
2	Ibid.	
3	Habermas,	Between	Naturalism	and	Religion,	310.	
4	Cooke,	“A	Secular	State	for	a	Postsecular	Society?”,	225.	
5	Habermas,	Between	Naturalism	and	Religion,	211,	111.	
6	Barbato,	“Conceptions	of	the	Self	for	Post-secular	Emancipation”,	549.	
7	Cloke	and	Beaumont,	“Geographies	of	Postsecular	Rapprochement	in	the	City”,	32.	
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third	section,	we	analyse	how	cognitive	and	embodied	understandings	of	postsecularism	need	not	
be	 seen	 in	 opposition	 but	 can	 actually	 work	 in	 cooperation.	 This,	 however,	 also	 requires	
reconsidering	 the	 traditional	 boundaries	 between	 secularism	 and	 religion	 and	 taking	 into	 account	
the	authority	of	secularism	as	a	power/knowledge	regime	that	shapes	contemporary	understanding	
of	 religiosity	 and	 practices	 of	 solidarity.	 To	 illustrate	 this	 argument,	 we	 explore	 contemporary	
discourses	 surrounding	 migration,	 particularly	 those	 concerning	 responsibility	 for	 the	 deaths	 of	
migrants	crossing	the	Mediterranean	in	the	attempt	to	reach	Europe	and	how	they	reproduce	in	a	
secular	fashion	an	underlying	theological	argument	that	blames	the	migrants	for	their	own	deaths.	
We	then	discuss	how	faith-based	organizations	may	be	considered	postsecular	agents	who	resist	this	
logic,	and	whose	contribution	encompasses	both	reasoned	argumentations	in	the	public	sphere	and	
embodied	practices	of	solidarity	towards	migrants.	The	conclusion	explores	some	of	the	implications	
of	the	arguments	advanced	in	the	chapter	for	future	research	agendas	on	postsecularism	in	IR.	
		
1. Habermas’	cognitive	account	of	postsecularism	
Until	the	mid-2000s,	Habermas	had	overlooked	the	constitutive	role	of	religion	in	the	public	sphere	
by	endorsing	a	model	of	dialogic	 interaction	based	upon	secular	 rationality.	However,	 in	his	 latest	
publications,8	he	has	questioned	the	extent	 to	which	 the	 ideal	of	a	common	human	reason	as	 the	
epistemic	justification	for	the	secular	state	can	demand	that	citizens	with	religious	beliefs	act	in	the	
public	 sphere	 as	 if	 they	 were	 devoid	 of	 any	 religious	 conviction.	 The	 problem,	 he	 argues,	 is	 that	
‘many	religious	citizens	would	not	be	able	 to	undertake	such	an	artificial	division	within	 their	own	
minds	without	 jeopardizing	 their	 existence	 as	 pious	 persons’.9	Moreover,	 should	 the	 secular	 state	
discourage	 religious	persons	and	communities	 from	expressing	 themselves	politically,	 it	would	 risk	
cutting	 ‘itself	 off	 from	 key	 resources	 for	 the	 creation	 of	meaning	 and	 identity.	 Secular	 citizens	 or	
those	of	other	religious	persuasions	can	under	certain	circumstances	learn	something	from	religious	
contributions’.10	 ‘We	 should	 respect	 the	 “power	of	 articulation”	of	 religious	 language	 and	 recover	
the	“regenerative	power”	it	offers	for	a	“dwindling	normative	consciousness”’,	yet	‘without	burning	
the	bridges	to	secular	languages	and	cultures.’11		
To	make	 room	 for	 religious	 contributions	 in	 the	 public	 sphere,	 Habermas	 suggests	 drawing	 a	 line	
between	‘informal	public	sphere’,	where	religious	reason	can	flow	unconstrained,	and	‘institutional	
public	sphere’,	where	only	secular	reason	counts.12	This	separation	means	that	for	religious	beliefs	to	
have	 institutional	 representation,	 they	must	 be	 ‘translated’	 into	 secular	 language.	 Separation	 and	
translation	 are	 for	 Habermas	 essential	 requirements:	 separation	 to	 protect	 religious	 and	 cultural	
																																								 																				
8	See	in	particular:	Jürgen	Habermas	and	et	al.,	An	Awareness	of	What	is	Missing;	Habermas,	Between	
Naturalism	and	Religion;	Habermas,	“Religion	in	the	Public	Sphere”;	Habermas	and	Ratzinger,	Dialectics	of	
Secularization.		
9	Habermas,	“Religion	in	the	Public	Sphere”,	8.	
10	Ibid.,	10.	
11	Habermas	cited	in	Harrington,	“Habermas	and	the	‘Post-Secular	Society’”,	544.	
12	Habermas,	“Religion	in	the	Public	Sphere”,	9.	
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minorities;	translation	to	allow	the	wider	public	–	be	it	secular	or	of	a	different	faith	–	to	understand	
and	subject	religious	arguments	to	rational	scrutiny.	
This	understanding	of	postsecularism	is	grounded	in	a	shift	from	traditional	to	more	reﬂexive	forms	
of	 secular	 and	 religious	 consciousnesses	 (what	 Habermas	 would	 call	 ‘postconventional	 morality’)	
capable	 of	 questioning	 their	 own	 limitations	 and	 recognising	 the	 reciprocal	 validity	 of	 their	
respective	 arguments.	 For	 Habermas,	 postsecularism	 is	 an	 ethos	 grounded	 in	 the	 mind:	 it	 is	 the	
outcome	of	 a	 cooperative	 cognitive	 effort	 of	 secular	 and	 religious	 citizens,	 both	 conceived	 as	 the	
expression	of	a	postconventional	consciousness	capable	of	reﬂecting	upon	itself	and	using	religion	in	
a	 way	 that	 may	 help	 us	 ‘express	 our	 best	 moral	 intuitions	 without	 tearing	 down	 the	 bridges	 to	
secular	 languages	 and	 cultures,’13	 thus	 keeping	 the	 boundaries	 of	 knowledge	 and	 faith	 ﬁrmly	 in	
place,	 preventing	 that	 reason	 may	 succumb	 to	 the	 potentially	 ‘irrational	 effusion’	 of	 religious	
motives.14	
Habermas’	account	has	received	two	main	criticisms.	First,	it	restates	the	primacy	of	secular	reason,	
as	it	requires	that	for	religious	arguments	to	have	a	space	in	the	institutional	public	sphere,	they	be	
‘translated’	into	secular	language.	For	Fred	Dallmayr,	however,	the	Habermasian	idea	that	‘there	is	a	
standard	 [secular]	 public	 discourse	 whose	 language	 is	 readily	 accessible’	 is	 ‘a	 myth	 of	 the	
Enlightenment’.	He	asks:	Are	not	modern	rationalist	texts,	from	Kant	to	Rawls,	‘exceedingly	difﬁcult	
texts	constantly	in	need	of	interpretation	and	re-interpretation,	and	hence	of	translation	into	more	
accessible	 language?	 .	 .	 .	 Do	 the	 judgments	 of	 courts	 not	 always	 involve	 the	 interpretation,	
application,	 and	 thus	 practical	 translation	 of	 earlier	 legal	 texts,	 precedents,	 and	 judicial	 opinions?	
And	do	members	of	parliament	not	always	claim	to	interpret,	apply	and	hence	translate	the	will	of	
the	 “people”’?’15	 The	 second	 main	 criticism	 concerns	 Habermas’	 instrumental	 notion	 of	 religion,	
which	reduces	the	latter	to	a	set	of	cognitive	choices	and	a	function	in	broader	processes	of	social	
production,	 where	 religion’s	 main	 (and	 somehow	 paradoxical)	 task	 is	 to	 address	 the	 crisis	 of	
instrumental	secular	reason.		
This	 perspective,	 as	 Luca	 Mavelli	 has	 argued	 elsewhere,16	 is	 the	 product	 of	 a	 dualistic	 image	 of	
human	nature	as	the	unstable	mixture	of	body	and	soul,	which	in	turn	supports	an	idea	of	critique	
and	emancipation	as	a	process	of	 transcendence	of	 the	body.	This	dualistic	 idea	of	human	nature	
finds	its	most	systematic	instantiation	in	the	philosophy	of	Immanuel	Kant.	Kant	conceived	of	man	as	
‘homo	 duplex’,	 that	 is,	 as	 a	 ‘sensibly	 affected	 rational	 being’	 split	 between	 the	 ‘freedom	 of	 pure	
intellect’	 (‘a	 rational	 nature	 .	 .	 .	 shared	with	God	 and	 the	 angels’)	 and	 the	 ‘desires	 of	 a	 sensuous	
nature’.17	 For	 Kant,	 our	 bodily	 and	 sensuous	 nature	 is	 ‘morally	 corrupting’,	 as	 it	 constrains	 our	
capacity	to	join	‘the	world	of	pure,	self-governing	intelligences’,18	where	all	concepts	have	the	status	
of	universal	frameworks	of	moral	and	practical	action.	Accordingly,	Kant	grounded	the	possibility	of	
																																								 																				
13	Habermas	cited	in	Harrington,	“Habermas	and	the	‘Post-Secular	Society’”,	544.	
14	Habermas,	Between	Naturalism	and	Religion,	243.	
15	Dallmayr,	“Post-secularity	and	(global)	politics”,	968.	
16	Mavelli,	Europe’s	Encounter	with	Islam.	
17	Hunter,	“The	Morals	of	Metaphysics”,	911,	910.	
18	Ibid.,	912.	
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critique	and	emancipation	on	an	 impulse	of	self-transcendence	whereby	the	 individual	 rises	above	
the	bodily/phenomenal/empirical	world	to	join	the	transcendental	world	of	pure	intellect.		
Kant,	 however,	 deemed	 traditional	 religion	 as	 an	 essential	 component	 of	 this	 process	 of	 self-
transcendence	for	two	main	reasons.	First,	religion	can	act	as	a	motivational	force	that	may	elicit	a	
moral	 life.	As	Emmet	Kennedy	explains,	 ‘Kant	thought	 it	 impossible	to	act	morally	 if	there	were	no	
sanctions	 to	do	 so	…	He	 feared	how	we	would	be	apt	 to	act,	 if	 there	were	no	ultimate	 reward	or	
punishment.	If	the	soul	is	mortal	and	all	ends	at	death,	man	can	calculate	his	pleasures	and	pains	as	
he	 likes	 (hedonism)’.19	 Second,	 religion	endows	 the	 secular	with	an	understanding	of	 critique	as	a	
process	 of	 self-transcendence	 where	 communion	 with	 God	 is	 replaced	 by	 communion	 with	 our	
‘higher	 intellect’,	 that	 is,	 our	 soul.	 However,	 according	 to	 Kant,	 once	 traditional	 religion	 has	
motivated	us	to	act	morally	and	embrace	a	communion	with	our	soul,	 it	should	leave	the	scene	to	
‘rational	religion’,	namely	a	‘universal	moral	faith’	that,	under	the	checks	of	reason,	can	perform	its	
role	of	guardianship	and	source	of	inspiration	for	moral	life.	
Habermas’	 idea	 of	 postsecularism	 actualises	 Kant’s	 notion	 of	 rational	 religion.	 Whereas	 for	 Kant	
traditional	 religion	 could	 act	 as	 a	 source	of	moral	 persuasion	 (often	 through	 the	 threat	of	 eternal	
sanction),	 for	 Habermas	 it	 is	 a	 reservoir	 of	moral	 resources.	Whereas	 for	 Kant	 traditional	 religion	
provided	 a	model	 of	 self-transcendence	 that	 enables	 the	 individual	 to	 grasp	 the	 universal	 law	 of	
morality,	for	Habermas	it	is	part	of	the	dialogic	interaction	between	secular	and	religious	mentalities	
that	may	enable	us	 to	 ‘express	our	best	moral	 intuitions’.	However,	 inasmuch	as	 Kant	 considered	
that	ultimately	traditional	religion	should	leave	the	scene	for	a	universal	rational	form	of	religion,	so	
Habermas	 conceives	 postsecularism	 as	 a	 domain	 in	 which	 secular	 reason	 has	 precedence	 and	
traditional	 religion	 can	 find	 a	 space	 only	 if	 translated	 into	 secular	 language.	 Finally,	 if	 Kant	
considered	that	rational	religion	was	only	possible	through	a	process	of	transcendence	of	the	senses,	
for	Habermas	the	only	dimension	of	traditional	religion	that	may	enable	a	postsecular	public	sphere	
concerns	its	cognitive	moral	aspects.	Accordingly,	Habermas	focuses	on	religion’s	semantic	potential	
and	 almost	 completely	 overlooks	 religion	 as	 a	 sensory	 and	 lived	 experience,	 practice,	 emotions,	
mode	 of	 subjectivation,	 or	 community	 of	 believers.	 Habermas,	 in	 other	 words,	 neglects	 the	
embodied	 dimension	 of	 religion	 as	 the	 latter	 is	 conceived	 as	 something	 that	 can	 undermine	
religion’s	semantic	potential	and	lead	to	‘irrational	effusion’.		
Habermas’	 postsecularism	 as	 an	 ideal	 of	 critique	 and	 resistance	 to	 the	 crisis	 and	 instrumental	
rationality	of	secularism	thus	rests	on	a	disembodied	rendering	of	religion.	This	requires	a	shift	from	
traditional	 to	 postsecular	 forms	 of	 religious	 allegiances.	 Once	 properly	 translated	 into	 secular	
language	–	i.e.,	once	turned	postsecular	–	the	moral	intuitions	of	the	former	can	be	useful	to	address	
the	 crisis	 of	 secular	 reason.	 This	 account,	 this	 section	 has	 argued,	 rests	 on	 a	 Kantian	 process	 of	
transcendence	 of	 the	 body,	 which	 supports	 an	 understanding	 of	 critique,	 emancipation,	 and	
resistance	as	part	of	the	search	for	universal	structures	to	oppose	to	the	ﬂuctuation	of	our	empirical,	
emotional,	 and	 embodied	 condition.	 In	 the	 next	 section	 we	 discuss	 how	 this	 rendering	 of	
																																								 																				
19	Kennedy,	Secularism	and	its	Opponents,	138.	
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postsecularism	may	curtail	our	 capacity	 to	 conceptualise	postsecular	 resistance	 in	 IR	by	 looking	at	
the	2011	Egyptian	revolution.		
	
2. An	embodied	understanding	of	postsecularism:	The	case	of	the	
2011	Egyptian	revolution	
A	 distinctive	 image	 of	 the	 2011	 Egyptian	 revolution	 that	 led	 to	 the	 ousting	 of	 President	 Hosni	
Mubarak	 is	 that	 of	 the	 chanting	 crowds	 in	 Tahrir	 Square:	 ‘self-organized	 plural	 groups	 working	
collectively	“on	the	ground”	and	laying	claim	to	the	present	and	the	future	of	Egypt’.20	‘The	people	
wants	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 regime’	was	 the	main	 slogan	 of	 the	 revolution.	 It	 embodied	 awareness	 of	 a	
newly	 found	 unity	 and	 a	 call	 for	 collective	 action	 that	 defeated	 long-established	 factionalisms.	
Indeed,	 a	 distinctive	 aspect	 of	 the	 initial	 (and	 short-lived)	 phase	 of	 the	 revolution	was	 its	 cutting	
across	the	institutional,	political,	and	psychological	barriers	that	had	long	‘polarized	Egypt’s	political	
terrain	 between	 more	 Islamically-oriented	 currents	 (most	 prominent	 among	 them,	 the	 Muslim	
Brotherhood)	 and	 secular-liberal	 ones’.21	 As	 Charles	Hirschkind	 points	 out,	 ‘[c]ompeting	 visions	 of	
Egypt’s	 future	have	 long	been	divided	along	 secular	 versus	 religious	 lines,’22	 to	 the	effect	 that	 the	
polarisation	between	secularists	and	Islamists	has	been	a	central	question	in	Egyptian	politics,	with	
implications	 for	 ‘every	 sphere	 of	 the	 political	 and	 the	 social	 realms’.23	 Accordingly,	 the	 chanting	
crowds	 in	 Tahrir	 Square,	 comprised	 as	 they	 were	 of	 secularists,	 Islamists,	 Muslim	 Brothers,	
communists,	leftists,	and	liberals,	and	where	Muslims	and	Christians	prayed	together	without	being	
perceived	 by	 leftists	 and	 liberals	 as	 a	 threat,	 could	 be	 described	 as	 a	 postsecular	 moment	 of	
resistance	to	Mubarak’s	regime.	
	
	
																																								 																				
20	Esmeir,	“Anti-Authoritarian	Revolution”.	
21	Hirschkind,	“New	Media	and	Political	Dissent	in	Egypt”,	138–9.	
22	Hirschkind,	“Beyond	Secular	and	Religious”,	50.	
23	Abdelrahman,	Civil	Society	Exposed,	108.	
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Joint	protest	of	secularists	and	Islamists	in	Tahrir	Square,	Cairo,	February	2011	
	
The	 intense	 postsecular	 rapprochement	 that	 marked	 the	 initial	 phase	 of	 the	 revolution	 deserves	
attention	 for	 two	 main	 reasons.	 First,	 the	 secularist-Islamist	 polarization	 in	 Egypt	 should	 not	 be	
understood	exclusively	as	an	expression	of	contending	political	visions,	but	also	as	an	instantiation	of	
secularism	 as	 ‘an	 expression	 of	 the	 state’s	 sovereign	 power’.24	 This	 perspective	 emphasizes	 that	
‘secularism	 involves	 less	 a	 separation	 of	 religion	 and	 politics	 than	 the	 fashioning	 of	 religion	as	 an	
object	of	continual	management	and	 intervention’	to	make	‘religious	 life	and	sensibility’	amenable	
and	useful	to	the	requirements	of	state	sovereignty.25		
Secularism	thus	understood	is	the	power	to	define	the	space,	forms	and	meanings	that	religion	may	
legitimately	‘occupy	in	society’.26	This	is	a	power	that	the	Mubarak	regime	constantly	‘exploited	over	
the	last	30	years	in	order	to	ensure	a	weak	opposition’.27	The	regime	regularly	presented	itself	as	a	
moderate	bank	against	 the	mounting	wave	of	 allegedly	 radical	 Islamist	 forces	 such	as	 the	Muslim	
Brotherhood,	 save	 for	 supporting	 ultra-conservative	 Islamic	 groups,	 such	 as	 the	 Salafists,	 as	 a	
counterbalancing	 ‘Islamist	alternative’	and	to	boost	 its	 Islamic	credentials.	Mubarak’s	strategy	was	
part	of	a	tradition	of	sovereign	power’s	management	and	‘use’	of	religion	for	political	purposes.	This	
includes	 President	 Nasser’s	 decision	 to	 bring	 Al-Azhar	 University,	 the	 world	 centre	 of	 Islamic	
																																								 																				
24	Agrama,	“Secularism,	Sovereignty,	Indeterminacy”,	500.	
25	Ibid.,	499.	See	also	Asad,	Formations	of	the	Secular;	and	Connolly,	Why	I	Am	Not	A	Secularist.	
26	Asad,	Formations	of	the	Secular,	210.	
27	Hirschkind,	“New	Media	and	Political	Dissent	in	Egypt”,	139.	
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knowledge,	under	direct	control	of	the	state	in	order	to	quell	the	opposition	of	the	Muslim	Brothers	
and	propagate	his	 vision	of	 socialism,	or	President	 Sadat’s	decision	 to	amend	 the	political	parties’	
law	by	forbidding	them	from	carrying	out	any	activity	considered	against	the	principles	of	Sharia	and	
national	unity	in	order	to	curb	any	potential	challenge	to	the	regime.28		
The	postsecular	rapprochement	between	secularists	and	Islamists	in	Egypt,	then,	was	not	just	–	as	in	
Habermas’	 formulation	 –	 the	 encounter	 of	 secular	 and	 religious	 mentalities	 recognising	 the	
reciprocal	 validity	 of	 their	 respective	 arguments,	 but	 also	 a	 form	of	 resistance	 against	 the	 secular	
power	of	the	Mubarak	regime	to	polarize	secular	and	religious	identities	and	shape	understandings	
of	Islam	complacent	with	sovereign	power.	Habermas’	approach	is	unable	to	grasp	this	dimension	as	
it	 conceives	 of	 secularism	 and	 religion	 as	 worldviews,	 rather	 than	 mutually	 dependent	 forms	 of	
power	 and	 knowledge	 where	 the	 portrayal	 of	 the	 secular	 as	 the	 domain	 of	 reason	 and	
argumentation	entails	the	construction	of	the	religious	as	the	domain	of	emotions	and	irrationality.		
Undoubtedly,	 the	 postsecular	 rapprochement	 between	 secularists	 and	 Islamists	 in	 Egypt	was	 also	
marked	 by	 forms	 of	 dialogic	 engagement	 of	 the	 kind	 conceptualised	 by	 Habermas.	 In	 particular,	
digital	activism	contributed	to	creating	a	space	of	convergence	for	secularist	and	Islamist	bloggers,	
which	 resulted	 in	 ‘practices	 of	 public	 reason	 and	 dialogue’	 and	 forms	 of	 ‘critical	 engagement’29	
concerning	 democratic	 reforms	 and	 opposition	 to	 those	 issues	 that	 plagued	 the	 life	 of	 ordinary	
Egyptians	such	as	unemployment,	tyranny,	corruption,	and	mistreatment.		
However,	this	dialogic	space	of	 interaction	was	also	accompanied	by	more	visceral,	emotional,	and	
embodied	forms	of	postsecularism.	Marc	Lynch,	for	instance,	discusses	how	Muslim	Brothers’	blogs	
often	presented	 their	 ‘human	side’,	with	 family	pictures	and	 stories	of	daily	 life,	allowing	 them	to	
‘form	relationships	with	non-Brother	youth,	each	discovering	the	humanity	of	the	other’.30	‘I	wanted	
to	show	that	Brothers	are	humans	who	have	the	same	dreams	[as	anyone	else].	We	have	fun.	We	
drink	 [tea	 and	 coffee].	We	 sit	 at	 cafés.	We	 go	 to	movies.	We	 demonstrate	 .	 .	 .	 and	 we	 blog	 for	
freedom’,	wrote	 ‘Abd	 al-Mun‘im	Mahmoud,	 author	 of	 the	 blog	 ‘I	 Am	 the	Muslim	 Brotherhood’.31	
This	 human	element	 resonates	with	 the	 reflections	of	 a	 secular	 blogger	 ‘Ala’	 ‘Abd	 al-Fattah,	who,	
following	his	encounter	with	several	Muslim	Brothers	in	jail,	wrote	on	his	blog:	‘They	were	from	this	
new	breed	of	Islamist	that	reads	blogs,	watches	al-Jazeera,	sings	sha‘bi	(popular)	songs,	talks	about	
intense	love	stories	and	chants	‘down	with	Mubarak’.32	
This	sense	of	emotional	commonality	found	a	vivid	manifestation	in	resistance	to	the	violence	of	the	
regime	 through	 the	 denunciation	 of	 the	 brutality	 of	 its	 political	 apparatus.	 Under	 the	 slogan	 ‘No	
more	 fear	 of	 the	 state’,	 a	 growing	 community	 of	 secularist	 and	 Islamist	 bloggers,	 since	 the	mid-
2000s,	started	to	post	on	the	internet	images	and	videos	of	police	abuses,	showing	how	those	being	
targeted	 were	 not	 just	 political	 opponents	 who	 supposedly	 threatened	 the	 regime,	 but	 ordinary	
																																								 																				
28	Shehata,	Islamists	and	Secularists	in	Egypt.	
29	See	in	particular:	Ibid.	and	Lynch,	“Young	Brothers	in	Cyberspace”.	
30	Ibid.	
31	Ibid.	
32	Ibid.	
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people	whom	the	 regime	was	 supposed	 to	protect.	These	 images	were	picked	up	by	 independent	
media	and	given	 further	 resonance,	with	 the	effect	of	 triggering	a	national	debate	that	 forced	the	
government	press	 to	 report	 the	news	and	the	government	 to	defend	 itself	 from	the	accusation	of	
torture.		
Some	of	the	bloggers	who	posted	images	and	videos	of	tortured	bodies	were	loosely	connected	to	
the	 Egyptian	 movement	 for	 change,	 also	 known	 as	 Kefaya	 (Enough!),	 demanding	 the	 end	 of	
Mubarak’s	 regime	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 democratic	 reforms.	 Established	 in	 2004,	 this	
movement	 brought	 together	 a	 vast	 array	 of	 Egyptian	 opposition	 forces,	 from	Muslim	 Brothers	 to	
secular	 leftists.	 Several	 Islamist	 bloggers,	 including	Muslim	 Brothers,	 also	 contributed	 to	 circulate	
documents	 and	 videos	 of	 police	 abuses.	 As	 journalist	 and	 blogger	 Hossam	 el-Hamalawy	 stated	
following	a	meeting	of	bloggers	in	2007	to	coordinate	a	campaign	against	Mubarak’s	police	torture:	
‘The	small	audience	was	a	microcosm	of	a	growing	rich	pluralistic	blogosphere.	There	were	religious	
and	secularists,	veiled	and	unveiled,	Copts	and	Muslims,	leftists,	liberal,	Islamists	and	independents–
all	keen	on	ridding	Egypt	of	 its	police	torture	epidemic’.33	 It	 is	noteworthy	that	the	brief	resume	of	
the	 conference	 written	 by	 el-Hamalawy,	 an	 avowed	 secular	 socialist,	 appeared	 on	 the	 Muslim	
Brotherhood	 website,	 to	 which	 he	 is	 a	 regular	 contributor.	 This	 website	 published	 a	 number	 of	
articles,	documents,	images	and	videos	against	torture,	often	in	collaboration	with	other	opposition	
movements.34	
By	making	videos	and	images	of	police	abuses	on	ordinary	people	public,	Egyptian	bloggers	not	only	
contributed	 to	 unleash	 a	 sense	 of	moral	 indignation	 and	 human	 solidarity	 beyond	 the	 secularist-
Islamist	 polarisation,	 but	 enacted	 a	 politics	 of	 resistance	 centred	 on	 the	 body.	 By	 forcing	 the	
tortured	body	back	into	the	public	domain,	images	and	videos	contributed	to	disclosing	and	making	
visible	the	inscriptions	of	power/knowledge	regimes	onto	the	body,	thus	turning	the	body	from	an	
‘inscribed	 surface	 of	 events’35	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 the	 regime’s	 power,	 into	 a	 source	 of	 resistance.	
Violated	 bodies	 became	 the	 metaphor	 of	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 unity,	 namely	 a	 postsecular	 unity	
encompassing	all	Egyptians	and	symbolised	by	the	body	of	Egypt	–	a	body	‘abused,	raped	and	beaten	
by	the	state’,36	but	also	capable	of	resisting,	if	only	for	the	initial	phase	of	the	revolution	and	the	few	
years	running	up	to	it,	the	secularist-Islamist	fracture	and	the	regime	that	fomented	it.	
A	key	moment	of	this	postsecular	politics	of	resistance	centred	on	the	tortured	body	was	the	death	
of	Khaled	Said,	dubbed	by	the	media	as	‘the	face	that	launched	a	revolution’.37	Khaled	Said	was	a	28-
year-old	 from	the	Egyptian	coastal	 city	of	Alexandria.	On	 June	6	2010,	he	was	beaten	 to	death	by	
two	plainclothes	officers	who	seized	him	 in	an	 internet	cafe.	When	summoned	to	 the	morgue	the	
next	 day,	 Khaled’s	 family	 members	 found	 themselves	 in	 front	 of	 a	 completely	 disfigured	 face.	
Khaled’s	head	was	lying	on	a	pool	of	blood	and	showed	several	fractures;	his	nose	was	broken,	some	
																																								 																				
33	El-Hamalawy,	“Bloggers	and	Rights	Activists	Against	Torture	Meeting”.	
34	Azimi,	“Bloggers,	Kifaya	and	Ikhwanweb	Against	Torture”.	
35	Foucault,	“Nietzsche,	Genealogy,	History”,	87.	
36	Rifaat,	“Blogging	the	Body”,	66.	
37	Ross	and	Cole,	“Egypt:	The	Face	that	Launched	a	Revolution”.	
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of	his	front	teeth	missing,	and	his	jaw	was	dislocated.	Khaled’s	relatives	managed	to	snap	a	picture	
of	his	deformed	 face	and	posted	 it	on	 the	 internet	 together	with	 the	accusation	 that	Khaled	 ‘was	
tortured	 to	 death	 for	 possessing	 video	material	 that	 implicates	 members	 of	 the	 police	 in	 a	 drug	
deal’.38		
The	picture	triggered	a	large	outcry,	with	massive	protests	in	Alexandria	and	Cairo	at	the	end	of	June	
2010,	and	went	viral	at	the	beginning	of	July,	when	Wael	Ghonim,	a	young	Google	executive,	opened	
a	Facebook	page	entitled	‘We	are	all	Khaled	Said’,	which	began	to	attract	supporters	in	the	order	of	
thousands.39	According	to	Human	Rights	Watch,	one	of	the	reasons	for	the	unprecedented	wave	of	
protests	which	 followed	 the	 death	 of	 Khaled	 Said	 is	 that	many	 people	 could	 identify	with	 him	 as	
victims	 of	 police	 violence.40	 This	 emotional	 identification	went	 beyond	 the	 sharing	 of	 a	 traumatic	
experience.	 As	 was	 written	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 his	 death,	 Khaled	 Said	 ‘was	 someone’s	 son,	
someone’s	 brother,	 someone’s	 friend,	 someone’s	 neighbour,	 someone’s	 customer,	 and	 if	 not	 for	
what	had	happened,	someone’s	future’.41	That	is,	Said	was	an	ordinary	citizen,	who	–	to	borrow	the	
words	 of	 a	 female	 opposition	 blogger	 named	 Baheyya	 in	 a	 2005	 post	 –	 represented	 ‘an	 entire	
subculture	of	invisible	citizens	in	this	country	with	first-hand	experience	of	the	state’s	ferocity’;	men	
and	women	with	‘scarred	souls	and	violated	bodies	whose	stories	we	don’t	know’.42	On	the	eve	of	
the	massive	protests	which	led	to	the	resignation	of	Hosni	Mubarak,	the	Facebook	page	‘We	are	all	
Khaled	 Said’	 had	 reached	more	 than	80.000	 supporters.	 It	was	 the	 first,	 together	with	 the	April	 6	
Youth	Movement	 Facebook	 group,	 to	 invite	 Egyptians	 to	 protest	 on	 January	 25	 (not	 incidentally,	
National	 Police	 Day)	 through	 a	 Facebook	 event	 page	 called	 ‘The	 Day	 of	 the	 Revolution	 Against	
Torture,	Poverty,	Corruption	and	Unemployment’.43		
Resistance	to	the	violence	of	the	regime,	to	be	sure,	was	not	the	‘cause’	of	the	revolution,	but	rather	
one	 of	 the	 ‘catalysts’	which	 precipitated	 the	 long	 list	 of	 Egyptian	 grievances	 (poverty,	 corruption,	
inequality,	 restriction	 of	 liberties)	 by	 bringing	 the	 confrontation	 with	 the	 regime	 onto	 an	 almost	
existential	 level,	where	the	tortured	body	made	public	epitomized	an	ultimate	form	of	negation	of	
life.	This	existential	dimension	culminated	in	the	‘exceptional	existential	moment’	of	the	revolution	
which,	as	Hussein	Ali	Agrama	points	out,	saw	the	protestors	standing	‘apart	from	the	modern	game	
of	defining	and	distinguishing	religion	and	politics’,	to	the	effect	that	they	‘expressed	every	potential	
language	of	 justice,	secular	or	religious,	but	embraced	none’.44	The	crowds	 in	Tahrir	Square	where	
secularists	 and	 Islamists	 gathered	 together	 were	 an	 exceptional	 (and	 short-lived)	 expression	 of	 a	
postsecular	politics	of	resistance	that	drew	inspiration	from	both	reason	and	emotions.	
	
																																								 																				
38	Al	Jazeera,	“Police	killing	sparks	Egypt	protest”.	
39	http://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed	(Arabic	version);	http://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk	
(English	version);	see	also	http://www.elshaheeed.co.uk/.	
40	Human	Rights	Watch,	“Work	on	Him	Until	He	Confesses”,	1.	
41	Ali,	“Egypt’s	Collision	Course	With	History”.	
42	Baheyya,	“Remeber	Them”.	
43	Sutter,	“The	faces	of	Egypt's	'Revolution	2.0”.	
44	Agrama,	“Asecular	Revolution”.	
11	
	
3. Towards	a	cognitive	and	embodied	postsecularism:	The	case	of	
faith-based	organisation	and	migration	
The	Egyptian	case	highlights	 three	main	 limits	of	Habermas’	account.	First,	by	neglecting	 the	body	
and	 emotions	 and	 confining	 postsecularism	 to	 the	 instrumental	 use	 of	 the	 moral	 teachings	 of	
religion	to	cure	the	distortions	of	secularism,	Habermas’	approach	makes	it	impossible	to	grasp	the	
emotional	dimension	of	postsecular	resistance	and	the	extent	to	which	it	may	be	linked	to	embodied	
practices.	Second,	by	neglecting	the	idea	that	secularism	may	be	a	tool	of	power	and	knowledge	that	
strives	to	shape	forms	of	religiosity	complacent	with	sovereign	power,	Habermas’	approach	makes	it	
difficult	 to	 distinguish	 between	 those	 religious	 doctrines	 (such	 as	 Salafism	 in	 Egypt)	 that	 support	
sovereign	power,	however	unjust	and	violent	 it	may	be,	and	 those	grassroots,	heterogeneous	and	
more	spontaneous	forms	of	religiosity	 that	emerged	 in	the	early	stages	of	the	Egyptian	uprising	as	
manifested	 in	 the	 common	 prayers	 of	Muslims	 and	 Christians,	 in	 secularists	 guarding	Muslims	 to	
ensure	their	security,	or	in	Muslims	guarding	Coptic	churches	during	Christian	prayers.	The	third	limit	
of	 Habermas’	 idea	 of	 postsecularism	 concerns	 the	 underlying	 separation	 between	 secularism	 and	
religion.	If	one	considers	Carl	Schmitt’s	famous	argument	that	‘all	significant	concepts	of	the	modern	
theory	of	 the	state	are	secularized	 theological	 concepts’,45	abandons	Habermas’	 idea	of	 these	 two	
spheres	 as	 worldviews,	 and	 embraces	 the	 idea	 that	 they	 may	 be	 political	 categories	 whereby	
regimes	of	power	and	knowledge	are	deployed,	what	emerges	 is	 the	possibility	 that	 the	boundary	
separating	secularism	and	religion	may	not	be	as	‘hard’	as	Habermas	suggests.		
To	 illustrate	 this	 argument,	 we	 discuss	 how	 contemporary	 discourses	 surrounding	 migration,	
particularly	those	concerning	responsibility	for	the	deaths	of	migrants	crossing	the	Mediterranean	in	
the	attempt	to	reach	the	coasts	of	Europe,	reproduce	in	a	secular	fashion	an	underlying	theological	
discourse	which	blames	the	migrants	for	their	own	deaths.	Consider,	for	instance,	the	October	2014	
UK	Government	announcement	that	it	would	no	longer	support	search	and	rescue	operations	in	the	
Mediterranean	on	 the	grounds	 that	 such	operations	are	 ‘an	unintended	“pull	 factor”,	encouraging	
more	 migrants	 to	 attempt	 the	 dangerous	 sea	 crossing	 and	 thereby	 leading	 to	 more	 tragic	 and	
unnecessary	deaths’.46	The	construction	and	distribution	of	responsibility	that	frames	this	argument	
portrays	 the	migrants	as	 fundamentally	 irresponsible	as	 they	have	chosen	to	embark	on	a	 journey	
that	 between	 January	 and	 September	 2014	 saw	 3000	 people	 lose	 their	 lives,47	 and	 over	 20,000	
deaths	 in	 the	 last	 twenty	 years.48	 This	 argument	 is	 made	 possible	 by	 deliberately	 neglecting	 the	
‘push	factors’	behind	the	lives	packed	on	the	precarious	boats	crossing	the	Mediterranean,	namely	
extreme	 poverty,	 persecution,	 war,	 famines	 and	 genocide,	 amongst	 others,	 with	migrants	 turned	
into	weapons	 by	 European	 fears	 of	 invasion	 and	 unscrupulous	 regimes	 such	 as	 Gaddafi’s	 and	 the	
Islamic	 State	 in	 Libya.	 By	 ignoring	 these	 ‘push	 factors’,	 the	 UK	 can	 portray	 itself	 as	 a	 responsible	
actor,	 whose	 responsibility	 consists	 in	 letting	 the	 irresponsible	migrants	 drown	 to	 prevent	 future	
																																								 																				
45	Schmitt,	The	Concept	of	the	Political,	42.	
46	Travis,	“UK	axes	support”.	
47	Brian	and	Laczko,	“Fatal	Journeys”.	
48	Shenker,	“Mediterranean	migrant	deaths”.	
12	
	
‘unnecessary	deaths’.	In	this	account,	the	migrants	are	the	only	ones	to	blame	for	their	own	death.	
The	UK	 is	by	no	means	alone	 is	such	a	harsh	stance,	with	successive	Australian	governments	using	
similar	 logic	 to	 justify	 the	 excision	 of	 the	 entire	 Australian	mainland	 from	 the	migration	 zone	 for	
anyone	arriving	by	boat,	the	current	‘stop	the	boats’	policy49	and	the	decision	to	leave	the	bodies	of	
drowned	 asylum	 seekers	 in	 the	 ocean.50	 As	Maley	 points	 out,	 such	 policies	 are	 not	 about	 ‘saving	
lives’	 or	 preventing	 ‘unnecessary	 deaths’.	 ‘The	 real	 message	 of	 the	 new	 Australian	 [and	 UK]	
approach	is	a	simple	one:	“Go	and	die	somewhere	else”’.51	
This	 logic	 enables	 the	 construction	of	migrants	 as	 bare	 lives,	 namely	 lives	 that	 can	be	 ‘killed	with	
impunity’.52	 They	 can	be	 killed	by	 the	 violence	of	 the	 secular	 law	 (even	 though	 they	have	not	 yet	
violated	 any	 law),	 which	 has	 decreed	 the	 halt	 of	 search	 and	 rescue	 operations,	 and	 be	 denied	
compassion	for	their	tragic	destiny.	This	condemnation,	we	argue,	can	be	understood	as	a	form	of	
secular	theodicy	or	sociodicy.	Theodicy	concerns	the	problems	of	how	to	reconcile	the	existences	of	
God	with	 the	presence	of	evil	 in	 the	world,	namely,	 ‘How	 is	 it	 that	a	power	which	 is	 said	 to	be	at	
once	 omnipotent	 and	 kind	 could	 have	 created	 such	 an	 irrational	 world	 of	 undeserved	 suffering,	
unpunished	injustice	and	hopeless	stupidity”?53	According	to	Max	Weber,	the	question	of	theodicy	is	
the	fundamental	question	of	all	religions,	which	they	have	addressed	by	inscribing	suffering,	injustice	
and	 violence	 in	 the	 inscrutable	 God-given	 order	 of	 creation.	 However,	Weber	 contends,	with	 the	
process	of	secularization	and	the	emergence	of	a	Man-made	order	theodicy	does	not	disappear,	but	
simply	secularises.54	Suffering,	violence	and	inequality	no	longer	find	their	meaning	and	justification	
in	 God,	 but	 either	 in	 the	 greater	 good	 (of	 society,	 the	 state,	 the	 economy)	 or	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	
individual	(ir)responsibility.		
Secular	theodicies	include,	for	instance,	the	liberal	idea	that	income	inequalities	can	be	an	incentive	
for	the	worst-off	to	improve	their	condition	with	overall	benefits	for	society	as	a	whole	through	‘the	
invisible	hand’	of	the	market55	or,	according	to	Pierre	Bourdieu,	neoliberalism	as	a	whole.	The	latter,	
Bourdieu	argues,	 ‘justifies	suffering	on	the	ground	that	 it	 is	necessary	 for	economic	progress’,	and	
legitimates	 a	 ‘racism	 of	 intelligence’	 which	 depicts	 the	 poor	 as	 ‘intellectually	 incapable’	 and	
therefore	 responsible	 for	 their	 own	 condition.56	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 drowned	 migrants,	 the	
underlying	 secular	 theodicy	 behind	 their	 double	 condemnation	 enables	 the	 projection	 of	
responsibility	whereby	they	are	considered	to	merely	deserve	their	due.	 In	 this	 framework,	 letting	
migrants	 drown	 becomes	 rational	 and	 instrumental	 to	 insure	 that	 the	 social	 fabric	 will	 not	 be	
destroyed	by	the	presence	of	‘others’,	that	jobs	will	not	be	taken,	that	identities	will	be	preserved.		
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This	 case	 raises	 two	 important	 questions	 in	 relation	 to	 Habermas’	 argument.	 First,	 while	 the	
justification	to	no	longer	support	search	and	rescue	operations	is	secular	and	rational,	its	underlying	
logic	 rests	on	and	 reproduces	a	 theological	discourse.	 In	 fact,	one	may	argue	 that	 the	 justification	
not	 to	 save	 drowning	 migrants	 is	 not	 rational,	 but	 purely	 instrumental,	 as	 it	 exploits	 popular	
emotional	and	irrational	fears	of	‘strangers’.	And	yet,	from	the	government’s	perspective	it	may	be	
absolutely	 rational	 to	 second	 these	 feelings	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 preserving	 power.	 What	 seems	
certain	 is	 that	at	 the	heart	of	 the	matter	 there	 is	an	ultimately	dehumanizing	 logic	 that	constructs	
migrants	as	a	security	issue	rather	than	human	beings	in	need	of	solidarity.	Habermas’	critique	of	a	
secular	 instrumental	 reason	 dominated	 by	 the	 disruptive	 forces	 of	 ‘markets	 and	 administrative	
powers’	which	‘are	displacing	social	solidarity’	and	incapable	to	address	pressing	ethical	and	political	
questions	 speaks	 to	 this	 case.	 However,	 the	 postsecular	 solution	 he	 advocates	 –	 drawing	 on	 the	
moral	intuitions	of	faith	in	order	to	infuse	values	into	the	secular	domain	–	rests	on	the	problematic	
assumption	that	secularism	and	religion	are	two	different	and	clearly	demarcated	worldviews.	As	the	
above	discussion	suggests,	however,	these	two	domains	may	often	be	indistinguishable.	If	this	is	the	
case,	postsecularism	cannot	be	conceived	solely	as	 the	cooperative	cognitive	effort	of	 secular	and	
religious	 views,	 but	 should	 be	 the	 very	 attempt	 to	 question	 these	 categories	 whenever	 they	 are	
employed	 to	 justify	 forms	 of	 violence,	 oppression,	 and	 exclusion.	 To	 this	 end,	 we	 contend,	 the	
cognitive	effort	cannot	be	thought	in	isolation	from	emotional	and	embodied	practices	of	resistance.		
Grassroots	actors	involved	in	forced	migration	are	a	case	in	point,	transcending	the	religious/secular	
divide	 and	 engaging	 in	 embodied	 practices	 of	 solidarity	 and	 resistance	 with	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
refugees.	 These	 practices	 have	 emerged	 largely	 in	 response	 to	 the	 secular	 theodicies	 described	
above,	where	asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 are	 criminalized,	 cast	 as	 lawbreakers,	 ‘queue	 jumpers’	
and	 potential	 terrorists,57	 justifying	 increasingly	 harsh	 policies	 of	 marginalization	 and	 exclusion.	
Faith-based	 actors’	 resistance	 to	 these	 policies	 draws	 on	 traditions	 of	 sanctuary	 and	 asylum	 that	
exist	across	numerous	religious	traditions.58	Actions	range	from	providing	housing	assistance,	food,	
education	 and	 healthcare;59	 billeting	 asylum	 seekers	 with	 host	 families	 to	 build	 understanding;60	
visiting	and	praying	with	asylum	seekers	 in	detention	centres;61	and	nonviolent	protest.	Grassroots	
actors	 draw	 on	 a	 range	 of	 resources,	 both	 ‘religious’	 and	 ‘secular’,	 to	 critique	 and	 challenge	 the	
theodicies	 underlying	 governments’	 asylum	 policies,	 offering	 alternative	 moral	 frameworks	 that	
utilize	 ‘religious’	 and	 ‘secular’	 arguments	 to	 recast	 migration	 as	 a	 humanitarian	 rather	 than	 a	
security	issue,	and	emphasise	common	bonds	of	shared	humanity	between	asylum	seekers	and	host	
populations.		
Let	 us	 consider	 two	 recent	 cases	 exemplifying	 cognitive	 and	 embodied	 postsecular	 resistance	 to	
secular	 theodicy.	 Led	 by	 a	 group	 of	 multidenominational	 Christian	 leaders	 and	 including	 activists	
from	many	and	no	faith	traditions,	Love	Makes	A	Way	(LMAW)	is	a	protest	movement	in	Australia,	
																																								 																				
57	Abbott,	“Press	Conference”.		
58	Wilson,	“Much	to	be	proud	of,	much	to	be	done”.	
59	See,	for	example,	Rabben,	Give	Refuge	to	the	Stranger.		
60	Stapleton,	“France:	more	than	space	to	live”.	
61	Wilson,	“Theorizing	religion	as	politics”.	
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self-consciously	 positioned	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 nonviolent	 civil	 disobedience	 engaged	 in	 by	
Martin	Luther	King	Jr	and	his	followers	during	the	US	Civil	Rights	Movement.62	LMAW’s	main	goal	is	
to	 raise	 awareness	 about	 the	 plight	 of	 children	 in	 detention	 and	 campaign	 for	 their	 release.	
Protesters	 conduct	 ‘pray-ins’	 at	 the	offices	of	Australian	parliamentarians.63	When	asked	 to	 leave,	
the	protesters	refuse,	saying	they	will	stay	until	they	are	told	when	all	children	will	be	released	from	
detention.	Consequently,	138	protesters	have	been	arrested	and	charged,	approximately	half	of	who	
are	clergy	and	nuns.	Some	have	been	strip	searched	by	police.	To	date,	however,	subsequent	court	
hearings	have	resulted	in	all	charges	being	dismissed,	or	small	fines.64		
Following	one	court	hearing,	protesters	stripped	to	their	underwear	outside	the	courtroom	before	
walking	 to	 the	 Foreign	 Affairs	 Minister’s	 office	 as	 an	 act	 of	 defiance	 in	 response	 to	 being	 strip	
searched	 by	 police.	 As	 the	 activists	 were	 disrobing,	 spokesperson	 Jarrod	 McKenna	 read	 from	
Matthew	5:38-44,	going	on	to	say,	‘Those	who	thought	that	strip	searches	would	be	enough	to	stop	
us;	well,	 we	 serve	with	 Jesus,	who	was	 strip-searched	 before	 he	went	 to	 the	 cross.’65	McKenna’s	
statement,	coupled	with	the	simultaneous	act	of	stripping	by	the	protesters,	 is	a	moment	in	which	
the	 cognitive	 and	 embodied	 practices	 of	 postsecular	 resistance	 can	 be	 clearly	 seen	 operating	
together.		
	
Love	 Makes	 A	 Way	 protesters	 march	 from	 the	 Perth	 Court	 House	 to	 the	 Offices	 of	 Julie		
Bishop,	MP,	Australian	Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs	at	the	time	of	writing.	
	
A	 second	 example	 is	 the	 Palm	 Sunday	 ‘Walk	 for	 justice	 for	 refugees’.	 While	 Palm	 Sunday	 has	
historically	been	a	focal	point	of	many	left-leaning	protest	and	resistance	movements,	since	2014	in	
Australia	the	marches	have	focused	specifically	on	opposing	the	Australian	government’s	treatment	
																																								 																				
62	Gray,	“Loving	disobedience”.	
63	Wilson,	“Theorizing	religion	as	politics”.	
64	Gray,	“Loving	disobedience”.	
65	Wahlquist,	“Christians	strip	off	in	Perth	court	protest”.	
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of	asylum	seekers.	Participants	range	from	religious	 leaders,	 lay	people,	activists,	unionists,	people	
of	all	faiths	and	none.66	Protesters	assemble	outside	landmarks	in	capital	cities	then	march	through	
central	business	areas.	Through	the	physical	act	of	gathering	and	walking	together,	disrupting	traffic	
and	carrying	signs	such	as	‘Jesus	was	a	refugee’,	protesters	engage	in	embodied	acts	of	resistance,	
while	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 through	 speeches	 given	 by	 leading	 figures	 in	 business,	 the	 arts	 and	 civil	
society,	the	cognitive	form	of	postsecular	resistance	is	also	visible.	
	
	
Images	from	the	2015	Palm	Sunday	March	for	Justice	for	Refugees	in	Melbourne,	Australia	
	
At	 the	 2015	 Perth	 gathering,	 acclaimed	 Australian	 author	 Tim	 Winton	 delivered	 a	 speech	
exemplifying	 the	 postsecular	 resistance	 we	 are	 describing	 in	 this	 chapter.	Winton	 challenged	 the	
secular	 theodicy	 underlying	 government	 policies,	 offering	 an	 alternative	 theodicy	 in	 which	 the	
Australian	government	and	the	fear	and	apathy	of	the	Australian	public	are	responsible	for	the	fate	
of	asylum	seekers,	not	the	migrants	themselves:	
So	great	and	so	wild	is	our	fear,	we	can	no	longer	see	them	[asylum	seekers]	as	people,	as	
fellow	humans.	First,	we	criminalised	them.	Then,	we	turned	them	into	faceless	objects…	for	
someone	seeking	asylum,	someone	arriving	by	boat,	this	special	species	of	creature	called	a	
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“boat	person”...	Pity	is	forbidden.	All	the	usual	standards	are	overturned.	Their	legal	right	to	
seek	asylum	is	denied.	They’re	vilified	as	“illegals”.	And	their	suffering	is	denied.	As	if	they’re	
not	our	brothers	and	sisters.	Yes,	we	hate	suffering.	But	apparently	their	kind	of	suffering	is	
no	 longer	 legitimate.	 And	 therefore,	 it’s	 no	 longer	 our	 problem.	 Our	 moral	 and	 legal	
obligations	to	help	them	are	null	and	void.67	
Winton	offers	an	alternative	moral	framework	that	draws	on	both	‘secular’	and	‘religious’	resources,	
including	 ‘mateship’	 and	 ‘a	 fair	 go’,	 themes	 central	 to	 Australian	 national	 identity.	 He	 draws	 on	
imagery	and	narratives	 from	the	Christian	 tradition	 to	critique	dominant	attitudes	 towards	asylum	
seekers,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 lauding	 secular	 egalitarianism	 as	 a	 defining	 characteristic	 of	
Australia:		
There's	 a	 punitive	 spirit	 abroad,	 something	 closer	 to	 Victorian	 England	 than	 the	 modern,	
secular,	egalitarian	country	 I	 love…	In	this	country,	a	nation	built	upon	people	fleeing	brutes	
and	brutality	for	200	years,	we	have	a	tradition	of	fairness	and	decency	and	openness	of	which	
we're	rightly	proud.	Whether	we're	inspired	by	the	Christian	parable	of	the	Good	Samaritan,	
the	universal	dignity	of	humankind,	or	the	sanctity	of	the	individual,	we've	always	thought	 it	
low	and	cowardly	to	avert	our	gaze	from	someone	in	trouble	or	need,	to	turn	our	face	from	
them	as	though	they	did	not	exist…	That's	where	our	tradition	of	mateship	comes	from.	Not	
from	closing	ranks	against	the	outsider,	but	 from	lifting	someone	else	up,	helping	them	out,	
resisting	the	cowardly	urge	to	walk	by…		
Now,	of	course,	we	don't	see	faces.	And	that's	no	accident.	The	government	hides	them	from	
us…	Asylum	seekers	are	rendered	as	objects,	creatures,	cargo,	contraband,	and	criminals.	And	
so,	 quite	 deliberately,	 the	 old	 common	 sense	 of	 human	 decency	 is	 supplanted	 by	 a	 new	
consensus…		
Jesus	 said:	 “What	 shall	 it	profit	a	man	 to	gain	 the	whole	world	only	 to	 lose	his	 soul?”	And	 I	
wonder:	 What	 does	 it	 profit	 a	 people	 to	 do	 likewise,	 to	 shun	 the	 weak	 and	 punish	 the	
oppressed,	 to	 cage	children,	and	make	criminals	out	of	 refugees?	What	about	our	 soul	as	a	
people?68	
Winton’s	speech,	arguably,	 is	not	a	call	to	a	particular	kind	of	secular	or	religious	ethics,	but	a	plea	
for	an	ethics	that	transcends	such	divisions	and	instead	focuses	on	a	sense	of	common	humanity,	a	
postsecular	 ethics,	 a	 plea	 echoed	 and	 taken	 up	 by	 numerous	 actors	 involved	 in	 asylum	 politics,	
within	and	beyond	Australia.	
We	 have	 argued,	 in	 this	 section,	 that	 the	 secular/religious	 divide	 underpinning	 much	 Western	
political	practice	and	analysis	of	religion	in	IR	must	be	rethought,	moving	away	from	understanding	
this	division	as	a	description	of	worldviews	and	 instead	conceiving	the	secular	and	the	religious	as	
political	 categories	 where	 regimes	 of	 knowledge	 and	 power	 are	 (re)produced,	 the	 line	 between	
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68	Ibid.	
17	
	
these	 political	 categories	 far	 more	 blurred	 than	 Habermasian	 postsecularism	 acknowledges.	 The	
analysis	 of	 the	 politics	 of	 contemporary	 forced	 migration	 highlighted	 how	 the	 secular	 and	 the	
religious	operate	in	this	way,	firstly	in	the	logic	employed	by	state	powers	to	exclude	asylum	seekers,	
which,	following	Weber,	we	have	described	as	secular	theodicies,	and	secondly	in	the	responses	of	
grassroots	 actors	 challenging	 and	 resisting	 these	 secular	 theodicies.	 Not	 only	 do	 these	 grassroots	
actors	 transcend	 the	 division	 between	 religious	 and	 secular,	 they	 also	 employ	 cognitive	 and	
embodied	forms	of	postsecular	resistance	to	challenge	secular	formations	of	power	that	oppress	and	
exclude.	
		
Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	explored	the	emergence	of	postsecularism	as	a	form	of	critique	and	resistance	to	
dominant	 secular,	 (neo)liberal	 ethics	 in	 contemporary	 IR.	 Much	 of	 the	 recent	 debate	 around	
postsecularism	 has	 been	 catalysed	 by	 the	 Habermasian	 approach,	 which,	 as	 we	 noted,	 is	
problematic	for	a	number	of	reasons.	Habermasian	postsecularism	ultimately	operates	from	within	
the	prevailing	secular	framework	and	logic.	This	is	evident,	firstly,	in	its	construction	of	religion	as	a	
primarily	 cognitive	 activity,	 neglecting	 the	 embodied,	 lived,	 experiential	 dimensions	 of	 religion.	
Secondly,	 Habermas	 neglects	 the	 power	 of	 secularism,	 enabling	 it	 to	 construct	 religion	 in	 narrow	
ways	and	delimit	where	and	when	religion	can	appropriately	enter	and	contribute	to	debates	within	
the	public	sphere.	In	essence,	then,	Habermasian	postsecularism	reinforces	rather	than	disrupts	the	
secular/religious	 divide	 that	 underpins	 the	 structures	 and	 logics	 giving	 shape	 to	 contemporary	
Western	politics	and	society.		
Following	on	 from	 this	 critique,	we	have	 suggested	 several	ways	 in	which	 the	debate	 surrounding	
postsecularism	may	 be	 expanded	 to	 address	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 Habermasian	 approach	 and	
enable	further	nuance	and	complexity	in	the	analysis	of	religion	in	IR.	The	first	of	these	is	shifting	the	
focus	of	the	postsecular	from	religion	as	a	cognitive	activity	to	understanding	it	as	both	cognitive	and	
embodied.	 The	 Egyptian	 and	 the	 asylum	 cases	 show	 the	 limits	 of	 a	 purely	 cognitive	 account	 of	
postsecularism.	 However,	 the	 necessity	 of	 a	 postsecular	 imagination	 capable	 to	 consider	 this	
embodied,	practical,	and	experiential	dimension	of	faith	clashes	with	the	cognitive	understanding	of	
religion	sustained	by	the	power/knowledge	regime	of	Western	secularism.	The	apprehension	for	any	
attempt	at	reconsidering	the	boundary	between	the	secular	and	the	religious,	the	rational	and	the	
emotional,	 is	well	 summarised	 by	Habermas:	 ‘[Once	 the]	 boundary	 between	 faith	 and	 knowledge	
becomes	porous,	and	once	religious	motives	force	their	way	into	philosophy	under	false	pretences,	
reason	loses	its	foothold	and	succumbs	to	irrational	effusion’.		
The	question	of	the	postsecular	crosses	paths	with	another	surprisingly	neglected	area	of	inquiry	in	
IR,	namely	the	study	of	emotions	in	world	politics.	Although	not	speciﬁcally	aimed	at	addressing	this	
debate,	 this	 chapter	 nonetheless	 explored	 some	 of	 the	 roles	 that	 emotions	 played	 in	 the	 2011	
Egyptian	 revolutions	 and	 how	 an	 embodied	 understanding	 of	 postsecular	 resistance	 in	 a	 non-
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Western	setting	could	prove	a	particularly	insightful	lens	to	this	end.	The	analysis	in	this	chapter	thus	
suggests	three	potential	future	research	avenues	on	the	postsecular	in	IR.		
First,	although	dominant,	the	Kantian-Habermasian	perspective	is	not	the	only	tradition	of	Western	
secularism.	William	Connolly,	for	instance,	has	pointed	in	the	direction	of	a	minor	Western	tradition	
centred	on	the	thought	of	Baruch	Spinoza	whose	‘metaphysical	monism’	challenges	the	mind/body	
dualism,	 considering	 them	 as	 expressions	 of	 the	 same	 substance.69	 This	 perspective,	 Connolly	
contends,	advances	an	idea	of	ethics	not	as	the	search	for	universal	categorical	imperatives,	but	as	
an	embodied-spiritual	cultivation	of	ethical	dispositions,	resisting	‘the	thin	intellectualism	that	grips	
secularism	–	 that	 is,	 the	 idea	 that	 thinking	can	be	separated	 from	 its	affective	dimension	and	that	
exercises	of	the	self	and	collective	rituals	merely	represent	or	symbolize	beliefs’.70	The	challenge	for	
scholars	 of	 postsecularism	 in	 IR	 is	 thus	 to	 move	 beyond	 the	 Kantian-Habermasian	 ‘cognitive’	
tradition	of	secularity	by	considering	conceptual	resources	of	contending	secular	traditions	sensitive	
to	emotions,	and	how	these	traditions	may	be	‘harness[ed]	for	radical	purposes,’71	such	as	devising	
modes	 of	 subjectivity	 beyond	 the	 mind/body	 dualism	 or	 disclosing	 the	 power/knowledge	
inscriptions	of	existing	secular	formations.	
Second,	 the	argument	 advanced	 in	 this	 chapter	 invites	us	 to	 look	beyond	 the	Western	 canon	and	
reﬂect	upon	the	postsecular	question	in	non-Western	settings.	This	leads	to	another	key	implication	
of	the	analysis,	namely	that	the	postsecular	cannot	be	considered	an	exclusive	concern	of	Western-
European	 societies	 as	 Habermas	 suggests.72	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 ‘[e]xtant	 conceptions	 of	
secularity,	secularisation	or	secularism	inevitably	ﬁnd	their	originary	impetus	in	Protestant	Christian	
settlements	negotiated	within	European	cultural	spaces’.73	Yet,	it	is	also	the	case	that	histories	of	the	
‘Western’	and	 ‘non-Western’	worlds	are	connected	and	that	secularism	is	an	 important	 ‘derivative	
discourse’	 in	 the	 Islamic	 world	 and	 elsewhere,	 where	 it	 ‘acquired	 a	 familiar	 currency	 in	 shaping	
models	to	banish	religion	from	politics’.74	
Third,	both	the	Egyptian	and	the	asylum	cases	demonstrate	that,	contra	Habermas,	the	secular	and	
the	religious	are	not	distinct,	separate	worldviews	but	rather	domains	of	knowledge	and	power	that	
can	be	deployed	to	mutually	constitute	and	reinforce	one	another	in	the	service	of	or	in	resistance	
to	 sovereign	 power.	Although	 the	process	 of	 disciplining	 religion	 could	 be	 described	 as	 an	 almost	
universal	 corollary	of	processes	of	 state	 formation,	 these	 reﬂections	 suggest	 the	 impossibility	of	 a	
single,	 undifferentiated	 understanding	 of	 the	 postsecular	 for	 the	 international	 system	 and	 the	
necessity	 to	 interrogate	 contextual	 issues	 that	 underpin	 postsecularism,	 starting	 with	 an	
investigation	 of	 the	 speciﬁc	 forms	 and	 practices	 of	 secularism.	 The	 power	 of	 secularism	 of	 the	
Mubarak	regime	to	foster	expressions	of	religiosity	complacent	with	sovereign	power,	for	example,	
cannot	be	considered	in	isolation	from	a	more	general	crisis	of	the	Islamic	tradition	as	marked	by	a	
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progressive	disconnection	between	dogma	and	conduct.	Egyptian	novelist	Alaa	Al	Aswany	draws	a	
connection	between	the	 fact	 that	 in	 Islam	 ‘rituals	have	become	an	end	 in	 themselves	 instead	of	a	
means	to	improve	and	chasten	oneself’	and	the	widespread	and	systematic	use	of	torture	in	Egypt.75	
It	 is	astonishing,	he	writes,	to	think	that	 in	the	‘human	slaughterhouses’	of	State	Security	premises	
‘there	is	always	a	prayer	room	where	the	torturers	can	perform	their	prayers	at	the	appointed	times	
.	 .	 .	Those	responsible	for	wrecking	the	lives	of	these	wretches	and	their	families	are	Muslims	who	
are	 rarely	without	 calluses	on	 their	 foreheads	 from	 regular	praying	and	who	never	 feel	 that	what	
they	are	doing	makes	them	any	 less	 religious.’76	The	 incapacity	of	 Islam	to	offer	 resistance	against	
this	violence	is	a	product	of	a	‘permanent	and	systematic	policy	applied	by	the	state’	as	well	as	of	an	
Islam	 that	 ‘has	 been	 transformed	 into	 a	 package	 of	measures	 a	Muslim	 has	 to	 complete	without	
necessarily	having	any	effect	on	his	or	her	conduct	of	life’.77		
Similarly,	 the	political	actors	articulating	and	 implementation	of	 the	secular	 theodicy	we	described	
where	migrants	 are	blamed	 for	 their	own	 fate,	 constructed	as	objects	undeserving	of	 compassion	
and	humanity,	are	often	the	same	political	actors	proclaiming	the	importance	of	Christianity	in	their	
own	personal	lives	as	well	as	the	life	of	the	nation.78	At	the	same	time,	activists	involved	in	resisting	
the	secular	theodicies	of	governments	on	migration	draw	on	both	‘secular’	and	‘religious’,	cognitive	
and	 embodied	modes	 of	 resistance.	 Both	 cases	 highlight	 that	 understanding	 the	 postsecular	 as	 a	
cognitive	 cooperation	between	 two	worldviews	does	not	do	 justice	 to	 the	 complex	ways	 in	which	
the	secular	and	the	religious	are	entangled	as	domains	of	power	and	knowledge	either	in	the	service	
of	or	in	resistance	to	the	state	in	contemporary	politics.	
As	we	have	attempted	to	show,	the	postsecular	involves	rethinking	our	understanding	of	subjectivity	
beyond	the	mind/body	dichotomy;	our	understanding	of	the	boundary	between	the	secular	and	the	
religious	as	the	product	of	multiple	regimes	of	power	and	knowledge,	rather	than	a	natural	divide;	
and	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 international,	 in	 a	 perspective	 which	 acknowledges	 the	 European	
genealogy	of	secularity,	but	is	also	cognisant	of	the	challenges	to	secular	formations	in	the	so-called	
‘Islamic	world’	and	beyond.	Ultimately,	the	postsecular	offers	a	new	critical	edge	to	reconsider	the	
very	 categories	of	 critique	and	 resistance	by	 interrogating	and	questioning	 the	boundary	between	
the	secular	and	 the	religious,	 turning	 this	boundary	 into	a	space	 in	which	new	forms	of	embodied	
political	agency	and	imagination	may	be	observed.	
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